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1. INTRODUCTION 5
1. INTRODUCTION
In a recent decade, a considerable literature has evolved concerning the
impact of transition reform on firms in former socialist economies. Gen-
erally using longitudinal analysis, many studies have tried to estimate the
extent to which these economies are moving towards market competi-
tion, the success or failure of privatization, dominance of insider or out-
sider ownership, and observable outcomes of other transition reforms.
However, notwithstanding the many insights it has provided, this litera-
ture has often failed to reach a consensus on the effects of specific re-
forms and the extent to which a market economy is in place.
This study attempts to shed light on the causes of post-reform differ-
ences in the performance of Ukrainian firms. The big question is: what
explains success or otherwise of firms in the transition economy of
Ukraine? Which firms are able to grow and to consistently maintain im-
proving productivity rates vis a vis others being trapped on the perform-
ance level close to failure? What are the factors that most influence out-
comes of the firm behavior in Ukraine? Using 1996–2000 longitudinal
data for 1,211 firms in various ownership, competition, and restructuring
conditions and controlling for industry, region and time fixed-effects, this
paper addresses one component of this multidimensional issue.
The narrow question for study is the effect of ownership structures (pri-
vate vs. state, concentrated vs. diluted, insider- vs. outsider-dominant)
and market competition on firm performance in Ukraine. Accompanying
by industry and location, these factors are probably the most important
observable determinants of performance outcomes. Here and throughout
the study, the ownership effect on firm efficiency implies performance
changes, which private owners induce by providing new incentives for
employees and managers and instituting effective corporate governance.
Privatization per se does not achieve efficiency benefits. To ensure the
transformation of incentives, a change in managerial behavior, and finally
better firm performance, it must create an effective mechanism of cor-
porate governance — a system that will assure owners of capital of re-
ceiving a maximum return on investment. Similar incentives to optimize
firm behavior are induced by market competition. Thus, ownership and
competition present the central interest for study, and estimation of their
effects on performance is the main objective of the project. The standard
production function analysis is a tool in investigating this relation.
The universe population for the study is Ukrainian medium- and large-
size industrial firms. It includes traditional firms that have been formed in
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the economy of the former Soviet Union, up to the onset of market re-
form in early 1990s. With the sample representation of 66%, the target
population is Ukrainian open joint stock companies, the core component
of the Ukrainian economy. Of the whole population of industrial firms,
this is the largest group of firms with the share of 60% in industrial pro-
duction, 50% in employment and the number of industrial firms in 2000.
It therefore receives the primary attention in the analysis of firm perform-
ance in Ukraine.
This is explicitly a causation study: the big question about success or other-
wise of firm performance in Ukraine translates into estimation of the effects
of privatizing firms, concentrating ownership and working in a more com-
petitive market for a firm. For example, I ask what would be the effect of im-
plementing more extensive privatization; concentrating ownership by large
shareholders vis a vis its diluting among numerous small shareholders? The
standard approach to estimation of the causal effects is random assign-
ment. Randomization of the ownership structure would ensure that every
difference in the behavioral outcomes of firms — the outcome of interest —
is determined by chance, and none of the omitted factors is correlated with
the included variables in the model. We would then safely report estimates
of the privatization effects. It is however unlikely to create an experiment in
which firms are randomly assigned to the group with some ownership form,
and a firm never deviates from its group. Under this limitation, the study
uses panel data, which, by providing sequential observations for many firms,
distinguishes between inter-firm and intra-firm differences and thus allows to
estimate the "before-and-after" or causal effect.
The research faces common for the econometrician analysis problems:
endogeneity of the key explanatory variable (ownership) and selection
bias. The first issue arises because the Ukrainian privatization process
had some systematic selection tendencies that may bias the estimates of
ownership. The government policy choices on which firms to keep and
how to regulate privatization of other firms were clearly non-random
events. Monopolies remained mostly in state ownership while loss-
making enterprises were often offered for privatization to reduce the
burden of on the state budget. Alternatively, firms with good profitability
prospects were more likely to be privatized in the first place and, fur-
thermore, to prompt owners to accumulate large stock. Hence, owner-
ship is endogenous and OLS estimation will produce biased estimates of
its impact on firm performance.
This problem is a challenge to address because we deal with observable
and unobservable factors in modeling firm performance. The available
production resources are observed. Technology, motivation, manage-
ment skills and inside information are unlikely to be easily observed and
1. INTRODUCTION 7
measured. They influence firm performance but are impossible to cap-
ture in recorded data. For example, a motivated manager is more likely
to be open to reform and efficiency-improving initiatives. Knowing this,
investors try to accumulate shares of this firm. We however cannot
measure motivation and explicitly include it in the model. Inability to do
so has fatal results: we omit the variable, which is correlated with the key
independent variable (ownership) and at the same time affects the out-
come of interest (firm performance). The orthogonality condition is vio-
lated and OLS estimates of the ownership impact would give biased, in
this example upward.
Furthermore, the problem of self-selection bias, i.e. nonrandomness of the
sample, might be important due to reporting bias. Despite the mandate to
report on performance and owners for every OJSC, some firms chose to
do so while others did not, which is unlikely to be a random event. Having
said that, I do not try to deal with selection bias in this study and focus on
solving the endogeneity problem. Furthermore, given the panel data con-
text, the consistent estimators may still be obtained although selection
bias is present (Baltagi, 1995). The estimation results are susceptible to
firms present in the sample. This sample limitation may restrict the power
to generalize the results to the underlying population.
I attempt to control explicitly for observable determinants of firm per-
formance and account for the omitted unobserved characteristics of firm
behavior employing a combination of several procedures. Postulating
randomly distributed individual specific terms across firms and planning
to draw inferences for firms outside the sample, I use the G2SLS ran-
dom-effects approach to estimate the production function model. In-
cluding firm specific controls should capture the effects of the omitted
factors, which are time-invariant: industry, location, monopoly status, and
privatization group. The time fixed-effects (year dummies) should ac-
count for the impact of nationwide overtime changes. Adding industry
trends tests the impact of various growth rates across industries. The in-
strumental variables for ownership should purge the relation between the
independent variable and error term.
As instrumental variables, I use observable factors that influence owner-
ship but do not directly affect performance outcomes — to mimic a ran-
domization of firms to different ownership structures. These are the
share of privatized firms in the region and industry production and em-
ployment, industry growth in the previous period and an indicator for a
leased firm1. Privatization was more likely to happen in the environment
                                               
1 I am grateful to David Brown and the EERC panel experts for pointing out the
possibility of using the industry and region privatization shares as instruments.
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where the pace of privatization reform was relatively high. Growing in-
dustries also motivate investors to enter markets and acquire firms from
industries with best prospects. Due to Ukraine's privatization legislation,
leased firms were more likely to be privatized in the first place.
The findings are threefold. First, the study provides evidence for Ukraine
that firm performance improves significantly with privatization. This effect
is particularly strong when several private owners concentrate ownership.
There is some evidence that privatized firms with dominant outside
shareholders are most efficient. Another finding is that market competi-
tion has little role in determining firm performance in Ukraine.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
theoretical background and empirical evidence on the relationship be-
tween ownership and firm performance and the outcomes of market
competition for firm efficiency. Section 3 describes the data. In sections
4 and 5, I outline the model specification for estimation and discuss the
results. Section 6 concludes.
2. DETERMINANTS OF FIRM PERFORMANCE:
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
Privatisation and its impact on firm efficiency have initiated perhaps the
largest interest and controversy in the transition debate. Another source
of dispute has been the impact of ownership structures: diluted or con-
centrated, insider- or outsider-held. Additional focus has fallen on the
role of market competition, hardening budget constraints, and restruc-
turing. Finally, interactions of these factors have given rise to more re-
search. As the following survey shows, there has been little agreement
about the manner in which these different variables impact firm perform-
ance.
2.1. Ownership and Performance
Many empirical studies have developed a theme of ownership transfor-
mation but a complete consensus on its impact has not emerged. While
generally anticipated to create efficiency gains, privatization somehow
failed to meet expectations. Despite the mounting positive evidence
for developed and most transition countries (Megginson et al., 1994;
Frydman et al., 1997; Brown and Earle 2000a), the privatization success
in terms of economic efficiency gains has often been difficult to pin down
in Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. Where is the
source of this disparity? What was wrong, if anything, with privatization
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policy in these countries? Stiglitz (1999) and Boycko et al. (1994, 1996)
relate the outcome of privatization policy in Russia to its bias towards in-
sider (worker and manager) ownership. This bias has arisen from gov-
ernment attempts to gain political support during privatization, and the
allocation of property rights to inside control to ensure such support. In a
trade-off between achieving social equity and economic efficiency objec-
tives, few governments in early transition sacrificed social justice. Hence,
we are observing the failure of insider and mass privatization to promote
efficiency growth (Earle and Estrin 1996; Aghion and Blanchard 1996;
Commander et al., 1996).
Many studies test empirically if the type of private ownership makes a
difference. In the spirit of the classic study by Berle and Means (1932),
diffusion of privatized property is predicted to give weak ownership in-
centives and thus to impair performance outcomes. As many studies
show, ownership concentration improves firm efficiency (Shleifer and
Vishny 1986; Megginson et al., 1994). Not only better monitoring of
managerial activities by shareholders promotes efficiency of firms with
concentrated ownership. Findings for transition economies also relate
efficiency gains to the probability of restructuring. This happens be-
cause owners push restructuring if they are satisfied with the firm gov-
ernance. The consensus on the beneficial role of ownership concentra-
tion is however incomplete. Some studies find no difference in
performance between diluted and concentrated firms (Demsetz 1983;
Demsetz et al., 1985).
Another matter of debate is insider versus outsider ownership. The
empirical studies on this issue produce ambiguous results. Some
studies find no significant difference between the performance of in-
sider- and outsider-owned firms (Earle et al., 1996). Other research-
ers show that insider-held firms perform better (Estrin and Rosevear,
1999), whereas still others argue for the opposite (Frydman et al.,
1997; Brown and Earle 2000a). These differences may be related to
the time framework within which the analysis is conducted. The ef-
fects of outsider privatization might require a longer period to be-
come apparent. What also may bear on the impact of privatization is
the distinction between employee and managerial ownership. Low ef-
fectiveness of employee-owned firms is depicted in many studies, it
being argued that workers are much less likely to initiate deep re-
structuring and trim employment. Hence, lumping these ownership
forms together may lead to a downward bias of findings on insider-
ownership effectiveness.
Different opinions on which type of ownership has the largest positive
impact on firm performance may root from the methodological and sam-
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pling construction disparities. Some scholars have used rather limited or
specialized samples (Megginson et al., 1994; Blasi and Kruse, 1995).
Others approached differently the selection bias problem. It is generally
recognized that the sequencing of state-owned firms to privatization was
not instantaneous and random: the state kept better firms, or alterna-
tively, first to privatization came the most profitable firms (Perevalov
et al., 2000; Brown and Earle, 2000a; Walsh and Whelan, 2000; Gupta
et al., 2000). To address the selection bias problem, Frydman et al.
(1997) in their study on the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have
used the fixed-effects (FE) procedure: controls for unobserved group-
specific time-invariant characteristics. In the study on privatization in
Russia, Earle and Estrin (1997) employed the instrumental variables (IV)
technique while Brown and Earle (2000a) united two approaches. Using
FE and IV estimators is probably the best approach to evaluate the own-
ership impact when the endogeneity problem besets the privatization
analysis.
In essence, the hypothesis tested is that privatization improves firm
performance. Most studies have shown improved firm performance
measured by labor productivity and total factor productivity growth
(Anderson et al., 1997; Earle and Estrin, 1997; Dewenter and Mal-
atesta, 1998; Brown and Earle, 2000a, b), revenues (Megginson et al.,
1994; Frydman et al., 1997; La Porta and Lopes-de-Silanes, 1997),
wages (La Porta and Lopes-de-Silanes, 1997), and employment
(Frydman et al., 1997). Megginson et al. (1994), La Porta and Lopes-
de-Silanes (1997) show higher firm profitability but most studies on
transition economies do not provide such evidence. The dominant view
is that using profitability measures is questionable. Profit is a poor
measure of firm efficiency in the short-run when restructuring efforts
can impose high short-term costs. It is also well-known that taxable
profit is subject to wide manipulations in some transition countries,
particularly Russia, Ukraine. Thus, profit can hardly indicate firm per-
formance, at least at this stage of transition.
Failure to give conclusive evidence to the beneficial role of privatization
prompted many researchers to think of combinatory effects that owner-
ship change and other reforms have in shaping firm efficiency. McMillan
(1997) stressed that "neither change could be effective by itself". Thus,
managerial change reinforces the positive effects of privatization (Dyck,
1997; Cragg and Dyck, 1999; Warzynski, 2000). Similarly, tense compe-
tition enhances efficiency in privatized firms alone. Brown and Earle
(2000b) report that competition improves efficiency of a firm if its com-
petitors are private. Thus, applying some policy reforms in tandem may
reinforce their direct effects on efficiency growth.
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2.2. Market Competition and Performance
Economic theory clearly implies that market competition enhances in-
centives for raising efficiency. Aghion et al. (1999) and Schmidt (1997)
explain that a competitive market structure gives sufficient information
for owners to create an effective managerial incentive system. In a more
competitive environment, the increased likelihood of liquidation of an in-
solvent firm pushes managers to exert a maximum effort. Also, in spite of
doubts concerning whether monopolies innovate less, a number of
scholars find strong evidence that competition promotes innovation
(Aghion et al., 1997; Blundell et al., 1999). Furthermore, as one may
elicit from Hart (1983), a competitive environment helps to regulate
owner-manager interactions most effectively. Nickell (1996), Konings
(1997), Dutz and Hayri (1999) identify the positive role of market compe-
tition for firm efficiency. Still, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999),
Brown and Earle (2000b) fail to find efficiency gains with more intense
competition. There is also evidence that the impact of competition on
performance takes the form of an inverse-U shaped form. In the survey
of 25 transition economies, Carlin, Schaffer et al. (2001) find that com-
petition has a large non-monotonic effect on the productivity growth.
Some market power is beneficial to firm growth and higher sales but
there are important constraints from competitive pressure to the gains of
monopoly power.
Further extensive discussion has been on government intervention. Dis-
criminatory governmental policy towards public and private sector firms
is neither new nor scanty. Kornai's "soft budget constraint" best de-
scribes the phenomenon of governmental assistance to some firms
(1992). This policy may manifest itself as barriers to market entry of pri-
vate firms that protect state insiders from competition, direct and indirect
subsidies, easier discipline of financial markets, and so on. In the pres-
ence of government assistance, Kikeri et al. (1994), Barberis et al.
(1996), and Bartel and Harrison (1999) show that state firms are ineffi-
cient in consequence of the assistance, rather than due to any impact of
ownership.
3. DATA DESCRIPTION
The universe population for this study is Ukrainian medium- and large-
size industrial firms. It includes traditional firms that have been formed in
the economy of the former Soviet Union, up to the onset of market re-
form in early 1990s. Newly emerged private enterprises (so-called de
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novo firms) are not the part of the study because they give no basis to
evaluate the impact of ownership change. Furthermore, created in the
environment of a market-oriented economy, they are likely to have dif-
ferent from traditional firms objectives, management, and consequently
performance. This population of firms is a topic of separate research.
Fig. 1 describes the universe population of industrial firms in Ukraine for
the period 1992–2000.
The target population for research is Ukrainian open joint stock com-
panies (OJSCs). Of the whole population of industrial firms, this is the
largest group of firms with the share of 60% in industrial production,
50% in employment and the number of industrial firms in 2000. In
Ukraine, this type of firms has emerged at the onset of transition
when the government tried to reform inefficient state enterprises
through corporatization and privatization. Although all OJSCs went
public, their shareholders have been different. For a majority of
OJSCs, private owners instantly or gradually have accumulated all
stock. For fewer others, state has remained the owner of all, control
or blockholder shares. Today, OJSCs is a universe of firms that fully
represent various types of ownership and market structures; the
pace, methods and magnitude of privatization, industries and regions.
This universe is the core of the Ukrainian economy, its largest and
most substantial component. OJSCs are thus critical for understand-
ing the behavior of firms in Ukraine.
100%
1992                1995                1998                2000
Fig. 1. The Universe Population: Medium and Large-Size Ukrainian
Industrial Firms. Number of Employees by Ownership.
Source: Sample Database and the Ukrainian State Statistics
Committee.
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There are two additional reasons to focus the study on OJSCs. This
group includes JSCs owned by the state and therefore their behavior
may serve a reasonable approximation of other non-JSC state firms. Un-
der the same owner, they are likely to have similar incentives, mecha-
nisms of governance and efficiency outcomes. In addition, performance
of Ukrainian OJSCs should not differ significantly from that of closed
JSCs, another important group of industrial firms. First, incentive and
governance structures are similar. The influence of insiders — often
through direct shareholding or trusted management of employees'
shares, connections with government authorities — is very strong at
closed JSCs. In contrast to the western experience, this is also true for
insiders in many OJSCs, which is one of the outcomes of Ukraine's in-
sider-oriented privatization (Estrin and Wright, 1999). Second, the period
after forming closed and OJSCs (1–5 years) might be too short for po-
tential differences to become apparent.
I collected and aggregated the firm-level and macro-data from several
sources. Microdata on ownership and performance of Ukrainian firms
come from the Center of Public Information of the Ukrainian State Com-
mittee on Securities and Stock Exchange. This institution collects annual
reports on shareholders and financial position, mandated for OJSCs
submission. Initiated in 1995, this mandate is for OJCSs only. Due to its
poor enforcement, some OJCSs have not reported to the Committee on
a regular basis or submitted incomplete information. The situation was
particularly bad in the first two years after instituting the mandate. For
example, the data for 1996–1997, available in the paper form only,
matches up to 25% of firms reported in later years. Because of this attri-
tion, the data is skewed to the 1998–2000 period.
Nevertheless, this non-survey source of the firm-level data is unique
as it accumulates the largest publicly available record on shareholders
and performance of an important universe of Ukrainian firms, OJSCs.2
Furthermore, it has no alternative in today's Ukraine. There are no
nationally representative surveys. Contrary to the developed markets
practice, Ukrainian firms overwhelmingly attempt to disguise and
misreport information on their performance and particularly on own-
ers. Government sources of microdata are not available too. Although
firms report to the tax and statistic authorities, Ukraine's legislation
prohibits any disclosure of this firm-level data. Most surveys con-
ducted at the micro-level have proprietary data on a small number of
                                               
2 Since 2001, the Center of Public Information has been providing data on a fee
basis only. The exception is data for 1996–1997, which is currently available free-
of-charge.
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firms (up to 300). The sampling and data collection design were often
structured to answer a narrow question of the study with little genera-
zability of the data.
Privatization-related data additionally comes from the State Property
Fund of Ukraine (SPFU). It incorporates the firm-level data on state
shareholding, initial ownership after privatization and its changes over
time, privatization methods, and some firm pre-privatization conditions.
In addition, the SPFU provides data on the state and regional monopo-
lies, strategic enterprises and proportions of privatized firms in the re-
gion and industry production, employment and total number of firms.
Standard macro-level data on industry output, employment, inflation, im-
port and market concentration comes from conventional sources: the
Ukrainian State Statistics Committee, National Bank of Ukraine and In-
stitute of Economic Research and Policy Consulting.
The sample of 1211 firms represents 66% of the target population
(OJSCs) although this number varies by year. Fig. 2 shows the sample
presentation of the target group, and Fig. 3 is for the sample coverage
of the universe of industrial firms. It evidences the discussion above: the
distribution is slightly skewed to the later years (1998–2000). The rele-
vant period for study is 1996–2000. This period has been chosen so as
to avoid the huge instabilities in firm performance associated with the
adverse effects of economic shocks in the early 1990s (trade and price
liberalization, privatization, disorganization), and to allow sufficient time
to pass for the effects of reforms to become observable.
100%
1996               1997                1998                1999            2000
60%
40%
20%
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80%
Fig. 2. Sample in the Target Population of Open Joint Stock
Companies.
Source: Sample Database and the Ukrainian State Statistics
Committee. The percentage in employment.
Pooled Sample Average
for 1996–2000: 66%
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Data on firm performance include standard observable variables of the
production function analysis: production inputs (real capital stock and
labor) and production outputs (annual revenues and production volume).
Monetary values are in 1995 thousand hryvnyas, deflated with industry
price indices for output data and machinery price index for fixed assets.
The ownership-related data include information on shareholders with more
than 5% of the company stock, which distinguishes between state vs. pri-
vate, private inside (management) vs. outside shareholders. The year, in
which a firm is privatized (more than 50% of company shares becomes
private), identifies the period of privatization with its important implications
in the Ukrainian privatization (Table 1). Determined by peculiarities of
Ukraine's privatization legislation, these are the sequencing of firms to pri-
vatization and the methods of ownership transformation: leased or buyouts
(1992–1994), mass privatization (1995–1998) and individual cash privati-
zation (1999–current). The sequencing of firms to privatization in the sam-
ple demonstrates large fluctuations in the Ukrainian privatization process
through time (Table 2) and across privatization groups (the latter literally
reflect the size and monopoly status of a firm) (Table 3). This process
gave rise to different ownership structures (Table 4).
In addition to the performance and ownership data, a number of firm, industry
and economic conditions are control variables. The firm-specific controls are
the status of the regional, state monopoly or a strategic enterprise3 (Table 5),
                                               
3 A strategic enterprise is a firm, which produces goods and services deemed
strategic for the national interests of Ukraine. The government identifies the list of
such enterprises.
100%
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Fig. 3. Sample in the Universe Population of Medium and Large-Size
Industrial Firms.
Source: Sample Database and the Ukrainian State Statistics
Committee. The percentage in employment.
Pooled Sample Average
for 1996–2000: 30%
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the firm privatization group (Table 3), 5-digit industry and 2-digit region classi-
fication (Table 6 and Table 7), and trade orientation, as measured by the
share of exported goods in the total firm production. Data on industry-specific
controls for observable differences in the firm behavior include market con-
centration indices HHI (Table 8), the share of imported products in a market
(import penetration), proportions of privatized firms in the industry and region
production output, employment and the total number of firms.
Table 1. Variation in Firm Performance by Period of Privatization.
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Labor productivity 19.5 26.0 18.28 13.79 25.7
Lagged labor productivity 19.7 31.5 16.27 14.25 29.4
Industry growth –2.7% –2.2% –2.6% –3.8% –2.4%
Lagged industry growth –5.5% –5.1% –5.5% –5.9% –5.6%
Source: Sample Database. All entries are averages for the period of the analysis. Labor pro-
ductivity is in thousand 1995 hryvnyas.
The data is however restrictive on production costs, adjustment of the
labor data for hidden unemployment, shareholders with less than 5% of
the firm stock, market and ownership concentration measures in the ear-
lier period of study (1996–1997). The first limitation relates to the large-
scale cost overstatement in Ukraine for tax-aversion goals4. Given the
vast profit understatement, I consider profit data exclusively as suppor-
tive, and restrain the analysis to productive efficiency. Another drawback
of the data is lack of the firm-level information on hidden unemployment
or under-employment of the labor-force due to employer-induced unpaid
leave, reduced hours of work, etc. It would be desirable to make these
corrections in an economy beset by problems of disguised unemploy-
ment; however, the available data do not allow for this option. Therefore,
the evaluation of labor productivity might be less accurate and underes-
timate the true labor productivity outcomes.
                                               
4 Ukraine’s official statistics reports 2% of Ukrainian enterprises as loss-makers in
1990, 12% —1995, 30% — 1996, 45% — 1997, 54% — 1998 and 56% in 1999
correspondingly.
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Table 2. Sequencing of the Sample Firms to Privatization.
Question: During past twelve months, was a firm privatized, i.e. at least 50% of its
shares has been transferred to private owners?
Year Count Cum Percent Cum percent
1995 33 93 7.7% 7.7%
1996 136 229 11.2% 18.9%
1997 368 597 30.4% 49.3%
1998 185 782 15.3% 64.4%
1999 152 934 12.6% 77.1%
2000 58 992 4.8% 81.9%
Not privatized 219 1,211 18.1% 100.0%
Source: Sample Database.
Table 3. Sequencing of the Sample Firms to Privatization by Privatization Group.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total sample 19% 49% 65% 77% 82%
Group A:
Small-size firms 37% 82% 86% 91% 91%
Group B:
Medium- and large-size
firms without strategic
enterprises or monopolies 23% 57% 75% 87% 91%
Group C:
Strategic enterprises
or monopoly firms 7% 28% 37% 51% 59%
Source: Sample Database.
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Table 4:. Ownership Structure of the Sample.
1998 1999 2000
Total number of firms 1211 1211 1211
Majority state owned 35% 23% 18%
Majority private dispersed 47% 57% 50%
Majority outsider shareholder 16% 18% 29%
Majority insider shareholder 2% 2% 3%
Source: Sample Database.
Table 5. Monopoly/Strategic Enterprise Status and Ownership of the Sample.
State
monopoly
Regional
monopoly
Strategic
enterprise
Total number of firms 221 85 378
Majority state owned 34% 40% 39%
Majority private concentrated 27% 14% 24%
Majority private dispersed 39% 46% 37%
Source: Sample Database.
Table 6. Industry Variation in Privatization: Proportion of Privatized Firms by
Industry.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total sample 19% 49% 65% 77% 82%
Chemical industry 24% 52% 58% 60% 64%
Construction materials 20% 68% 83% 97% 97%
Energy sector 9% 9% 14% 34% 37%
Food-processing 25% 59% 84% 92% 94%
Machinery 17% 47% 59% 70% 77%
Metallurgy 21% 51% 62% 69% 71%
Paper & wood-processing 13% 70% 74% 87% 91%
Procurement 20% 49% 62% 81% 86%
Textile industry 35% 55% 74% 81% 81%
Source: Sample Database. Percentage of firms.
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Table 7. Geographic Variation in Privatization: Proportion of Privatized Firms
by Region.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total sample 19% 49% 65% 77% 82%
Eastern Ukraine 17% 49% 62% 75% 82%
Northern and central 22% 52% 69% 79% 83%
South Ukraine 17% 41% 54% 70% 76%
West Ukraine 20% 50% 67% 80% 84%
Source: Sample Database Percentage of firms.
Table 8. Market and Ownership Structure of the Sample.
Low market
concentration
<25%
HHI <2500
Medium market
concentration
25–50%
HHI 2500–5000
High market
concentration
>50%
HHI 5000>
Total number of firms 706 320 185
Majority state owned 14% 25% 21%
Majority private
concentrated 30% 36% 30%
Majority private
dispersed 56% 39% 49%
Source: Sample Database
The availability of data on owners with shares above 5% restricts the
analysis of insider-outsider ownership to concentrated structures only
(owners with at least 25%). Private owners with shares below 5% are not
distinguishable. Nevertheless, I suggest that in Ukraine dispersed inside
(employees) and outside shareholders do not differ substantially in their
influence on firm governance and performance, and thus can be united
into one group. Both types of newly-emerged shareholders have virtually
no market knowledge and experience. Furthermore, poor protection of
minority ownership rights and undeveloped stock markets puts small
outside and inside owners in similar conditions.
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With the available data, the exact measures of market concentration in
1996–1997 cannot be calculated. I therefore impute this data from the
available observations in later years postulating that the rates of change
and behavioral patterns are similar in both early and later periods. I use
annual differences of the average industry HHI in 1998–1999. The as-
sumption on relative stability of the market structure may be reasonable
for the Ukrainian economy, which is so far characterized by weak market
dynamics. Stock markets are in the infant state. Mergers are rare events;
foreign penetration is even less common. The data empirically supports
this assumption: in 1998–1999, the mean annual change in market con-
centration was 1%.
Summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 9.
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL
In the spirit of many prior studies, I evaluate firm performance by pro-
duction rather than cost efficiency. Obscure accounting standards, non-
market pricing of inputs and products and large-scale tax avoidance in
ex-Soviet countries, make performance measures notoriously difficult to
evaluate. In this respect, profit data present the worst case, and I ignore
it in the analysis. Driven by the big question of the study — what explains
firm performance — I model firm productivity with standard production
inputs, capital and labor, and observable factors expected to most influ-
ence efficiency of firms in transition society.
As performance indicators, I use the value of output and sale revenues,
deflated using three-digit industry price indices to conduct comparison in
real terms. In Ukraine, the Soviet period practice of manufacturing for its
own sake (with concomitant wide-spread overstocking), rather than con-
sumer-oriented production, was common, at least in the early years of
transition. Therefore, output may sometimes give misleading inferences
about firm performance. Using output and sales synchronously may help
attenuate this problem.
I estimate the two-factor production function:
Y = F (A, K, L),
where Y is the performance indicator being estimated, K and L are pro-
duction inputs, the real capital stock and labor respectively. A designates
total factor productivity and is a vector of ownership and market charac-
teristics and unobservables relegating their effect on the outcome vari-
able to the error term. Assuming a logarithmic form for the standard
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Table 9. Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Outcomes:
Sales revenues
(thousands 1995 hryvnyas)
Output
(thousands 1995 hryvnyas)
Explanatory variables:
Firm characteristics:
Number of employees
Real capital stock
(in thousands of 1995 hryvnyas)
Private ownership, %
Concentrated private
ownership, %
Dispersed private ownership, %
Insider ownership, %
Outsider ownership, %
State monopoly
Regional monopoly
Strategic enterprise
Trade orientation, %
Privatization group1
Privatization group 2
Privatization group 3
Leasing firm
Industry characteristics:
Market concentration:
Herfindahl–Hirschman
Index (HHI)
Import penetration
Production output growth
in the previous period, %
Privatized firms
in the regional production, %
Privatized firms
in the industry production, %
Privatized firms
in the regional employment, %
Privatized firms
in the industry employment, %
35811.8
29460.2
1638
37791.8
62.7
11.1
45.2
5.2
10.5
0.2
0.1
0.3
9.8
0.1
0.7
0.3
0.2
0.25
0.28
–5.5
54.8
52.5
24.9
50.8
130403.5
115434.1
3140
103022.4
38.6
22.6
42.7
11.1
21.8
0.4
0.3
0.5
29.7
0.1
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.25
0.27
14.8
14.3
20.7
5.3
20.1
0.3
0.2
12
1.21
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.02
0.01
–68.9
15.8
4.6
10.8
3.1
2302825.0
2208328.0
49443
1756175
100
99.9
100
88.0
99.9
1
1
1
98.1
1
1
1
1
0.98
0.85
109.5
92.6
86.1
36.6
83.1
Source: Data on firm production inputs, performance and ownership is from the Center of Public In-
formation of the Ukrainian State Committee on Securities and Stock Exchange. The State Property
Fund of Ukraine provides data on the state, regional monopoly and strategic enterprise status; pro-
portion of the region and industry output produced by privatized firms, privatization group. Data on
market concentration is provided by the Institute of Economic Research and Policy Consulting. Mac-
roeconomic indicators are from the Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics and National Bank of
Ukraine.
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Cobb–Douglass production function, the general estimation function of
performance on production inputs and vectors of ownership, market and
firm-specific characteristics, can be written as follows:
0 1Log Log Log
_ ,
it it it n it
n
m it k i it
m k
Y L K OWNERSHIP
MARKET FIRM CONTROLS u
β β β
β β
= + + +
+ + +
∑
∑ ∑ (1)
where i indexes firms, t periods and the β  are the estimation parame-
ters. Definition of all variables for the analysis is given in Table 10.
Table 10. Variable Description.
Variable Definition
Outcomes:
Sales revenue
(thousands 1995 hryvnyas)
Gross annual revenues, deflated using
industry price indexes.
Output
(thousands 1995 hryvnyas)
Gross annual output, deflated using
industry price indexes.
Explanatory variables:
Firm characteristics:
Number of employees Annual average number of employees.
Net capital stock
(in thousands of 1995 hryvnyas)
Real capital stock net of depreciation;
deflated using machinery & equipment
price index.
Private ownership, % Sum of all private shares.
Privatization One if private ownership >50%.
Concentrated ownership, % Sum of private stakes above 25% each.
Dispersed private ownership, % Sum of private shares below 25% each.
Insider ownership, % Sum of outside shareholder shares
(above 25% each).
Outsider ownership, % Sum of insider (management) shares
above 25% each.
State monopoly Firm status of a state monopoly defined
by the Ukrainian Antimonopoly Committee.
Regional monopoly Firm status of a regional monopoly defined
by the Ukrainian Antimonopoly Committee.
Strategic enterprise Firm status of a strategic enterprise
defined by the Ukrainian Cabinet
of Ministers.
Trade orientation Share of firm sales on export.
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Continued from p. 22
Variable Definition
Explanatory variables:
Firm characteristics:
Privatization group by Ukraine's
privatization program (1–3)
Dichotomous variables group1–3:
1 — small firms, 2 — med- and large-size
firms, 3 — strategic firms & monopolies.
Leasing firm Leasing firm on the moment of firm
privatization.
Industry (13 sectors) Industry dummies
(two-digit disaggregation).
Location (4 regions) Region dummies
(east, west, north & south)
Industry characteristics:
Market concentration:
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
Sum of the squared market shares
of all producers in a disaggregated
four-digit industry, divided by 10,000.
Import penetration Proportion of the value of imported goods
in the market.
Industry production growth
in the previous period, %
Growth of production output in industry,
by three-digit industry classification.
Privatized firms in the industry
(region) production output.
Share of the industry (region) output
produced by privatized firms.
Privatized firms in the industry
(region) employment.
Share of privatized firms in the industry
(region) employment.
Time effects Year dummies (1996–2000).
The vector of ownership variables is threefold.5 The first distinction is
between state and non-state (privatized) firms. The benchmark for state
ownership is the 50% + 1 share, or the controlling stake, held by gov-
ernment. Under the assumption that large shareholders, including the
state, do not behave passively, this selection makes sense. A firm with
mixed private-state ownership but the controlling share belonging to the
government may perform similarly to firms with full state ownership. The
hypothesis for study is that privatization — by providing more effective
incentive structure and corporate governance — improves firm efficiency.
The estimation model for this analysis takes on the following form where
                                               
5 Due to a negligible share of foreign ownership in Ukraine (0.1% in 1998), it is
not considered separately.
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Privatized assumes either an indicator variable (more than 50% is pri-
vate) in (2) or a continuous variable (sum of all private shares) in (3)
β β β
β β
= + + +
+ + +∑ ∑
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Another distinction is associated with separating ownership from control.
In other words, private firms are distinguished by their ownership con-
centration. Here firms are divided into those that are widely held, i.e.
those with a dispersed ownership structure, and those with relatively few
large owners, with a concentrated ownership structure. The benchmark
to decide if an owner is sufficiently large to create ownership concentra-
tion is a 25% + 1 stake (the blockholding share). The presumption is that
concentrated shareholding addresses the need for a mechanism to pro-
tect investors from managerial expropriation and resolves the principal-
agent problem more effectively than dispersed ownership structures.
Effective corporate governance of a firm leads to better firm perform-
ance. The relevant regression assumes the form where the variable for
private concentrated shareholding is Concentrated Share (sum of private
shares over 25%) and Dispersed Share (sum of private shares below
25%) represents dispersed ownership structures.
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The final distinction is insider- vs. outsider-dominant ownership. As
discussed above, the availability of data on owners with shares above
5% restricts the study of insider-outsider ownership to concentrated
structures. Given the instrumental role that managers play in many
Ukrainian firms (due to inherent from the Soviet era "paternalistic"
image, connections and inside information), I expect a significant
difference in performance of manager-owned firms and firms with
shareholding concentrated by outsiders. The respective model
includes variables for insider ownership Insider Share (sum of mana-
gerial shares over 25%), outsider ownership Outsider Share (sum
of stock over 25% held by outsiders), and dispersed ownership
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Dispersed Share (sum of private shares below 25%).
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I try to incorporate the impact of market environment by including the
variables for market structure and import penetration. As an indicator of
market structure, I adopt a commonly used measure of market concen-
tration, the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) calculated for four-digit in-
dustries. Following Brown and Earle (2000b), I assume an exogenous
market structure in Ukraine. Since the onset of transition and given the
speed of reform, the period of market formation was probably too short
to induce endogeneity of the market structure. It is unlikely that fluctua-
tions in firm profits gave rise to significant changes in the concentration
of market power in some markets. A more realistic assumption for
Ukraine is that its industry structures have not changed much from what
has been inherent from the Soviet period. Therefore, for Ukraine's tran-
sition economy the probability of the market structure endogeneity is
relatively low. Because the HHI accounts only for domestic competition, I
include a measure for additional market pressure, induced by foreign
competitors. Import penetration is the share of imported goods and
services in the value of products in every industry.
Firm-specific controls include time-invariant factors that may correlate
with firm performance. These are indicators of the state and regional
monopoly, strategic enterprise, privatization group (Law of Ukraine on
the State Privatization Program), industry, location and trade orientation
(the share of exports in total production). I include time effects, as the
transition environment fluctuations over time may be influential in
Ukraine.
In light of the above discussion of a three-dimension ownership vector, I
estimate several model specifications starting with the one that includes
privatization as an indicator variable (2), following with the one of total
private shares (3), the sums of concentrated and dispersed private
shares (4), and finally distinguishing between private large inside and
outside shareholders and small shareholders (5). State ownership is
therefore always a benchmark for comparison.
To test the robustness of the estimation results, both for ownership and
for market structure effects, I estimate alternative specifications of the
basic model. It is possible that the effect of market competition is sensi-
tive to the inclusion of firms from regulated industries, e.g. energy sec-
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tor. Similarly, the effect of ownership might be dependent on the firms
being monopolies or strategic enterprises, as these firms have different
from average performance (Table 11). In additional specifications, I con-
sider industry specific (linear) time trends assuming there were system-
atic patterns in variation across industry trends that would significantly
affect firm performance and would not be captured in industry and time
fixed effects.
Table 11. Annual Revenue Growth by Firm Ownership and Monopoly Status.
All firms
Non-strategic
enterprises
or monopoly firms
Strategic
enterprises
or monopoly firms
Total number of firms 1211 744 467
All firms 3.3% 2.0% 5.3%
Majority state owned 4.4% –11.1% 18.4%
Majority private
dispersed 0.8% –1.5% 3.9%
Majority private
concentrated 8.3% 8.8% 7.2%
Source: Sample Database.
The model estimation raises several econometric problems. The biggest
challenge is the specification problem: selection of variables in a model
and the relation between these variables and omitted but important fac-
tors for the outcome variable. If this relation exists, not accounting
explicitly for the omitted variables (due to data unavailability or specifica-
tion error) will reflect their effects in a model through the error term.
Technically, the orthodonality assumption will be violated, and the esti-
mates will be biased. As the discussion above emphasized, we cannot
observe and implicitly control for all factors correlated with ownership
and firm performance (e.g. the firm true "value"). Hence, it is essential
to beware of the danger of using OLS and adopt techniques that are
more appropriate.
Furthermore, proceeding with the estimation that postulates the identical
(i.i.d.) distribution of the residuals across observations is not verified for
panel data. Multiple observations on the same units give autocorrelated
error terms and these error terms are unlikely to have constant variance.
To obtain optimal variance minimizing estimators, the clustering estima-
tion options and generalized least squares (GLS) analysis are used.
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To address the specification problem, I combine several procedures.
I first pool the data and apply the IV (2SLS) estimation procedure to the
performance model with instrumented ownership. I use this technique
for the pooled clustered data and cross-section data in year 2000.
I then estimate the panel data using the Balestra and Varadharajan–
Krishnakumar‘s G2SLS random-effects approach6. In postulating condi-
tional distribution of unobserved effects, given observed exogenous
variables, the assumption of randomly distributed individual specific
terms across firms seems to be more plausible. Assuming constant
differences across units, the fixed-effects approach produces results
conditional on the units in the sample. The fixed effects model would
be therefore appropriate for estimating the sample, which fully repre-
sents the underlying population (e.g. all countries). The data for this
study, however, is drawn of observations from a large population of
firms. It represents a small part of the underlying population rather than
exhaust it. In this context, if we want to draw inferences on individuals
outside the sample, the random-effects approach is more reasonable
(Wooldridge, 2002; Greene 2000). Furthermore, postulating fixed dif-
ferences across firms in the dynamic environment of a transition econ-
omy may be debatable. Finally, some truly fixed differences across
firms (industry, location) are possible to control in the random-effects
estimation with dummies.
I try to instrument endogenous ownership with a set of variables, which
highly correlate with ownership and at the same time effect performance
only through ownership. These are the proportion of privatized firms in
the regional and industry production and employment, industry growth in
the past period and the leased firm indicator7. Privatization was more
likely to happen in the environment where the pace of privatization re-
form was relatively high. This is to some extent an explicit indicator of
whether institutional and political conditions favor privatization (Brown
and Earle, 2000a). At the same time, firm performance is unlikely to de-
pend directly on the extent of privatization in the region and/or industry.
                                               
6 The Breusch–Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects rejects the null
hypothesis of Var(v[i]) = 0. The Hausman test results vary depending on the per-
formance indicators and types of ownership with the majority of cases being in-
significant. This suggests that random effects may be used in estimation although
some caution is desired in interpreting its results.
7 Both employment and production are used to allow for a broader analysis of the
privatization process. Although these measures are related, they may each have
captured some specific tendency in the development of privatization in Ukraine
and thus their joint effect on ownership may give additional information in pre-
dicting endogenous ownership (Table 9).
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Similarly, industry growth in the past period is likely to attract investors to
these markets but rather unlikely to affect firm efficiency in the next pe-
riod. By the setup of Ukraine's privatization legislation, leased firms were
more likely to be privatized in the first place (via free-of-charge transfer
to employees or buyout). However, being a leased firm should not be
correlated directly with firm performance.
As often, good instruments are hard to find and they often remain open
to question. The best choice of an instrumental variable would be truly
random or close to random: distance, price, policy. This is however not
feasible. Thus, the assumption that the share of privatized firms in the
regional and industry production/employment and industry growth in the
previous period, are uncorrelated with firm performance is crucial to the
consistency of IV estimates. Technically, the condition postulates
cov , 0Z ε =    where Z is an instrument for ownership and ε  is an unob-
served error term. Contrary to the second requirement for the validity of
IV estimates, cov , 0X Z ≠   , this condition is not testable. It is therefore
an a priori assumption for the study that the only way that the chosen IVs
affect firm performance is through ownership.
To verify this assumption, I compared firm performance by groups of
state-owned and privatized firms and the industry/region privatization
shares. The descriptive analysis provides evidence to the assumption
that the distribution of firm performance is for practical purposes directly
independent of the extent of privatization in the industry and region, and
their observable relation is conditional on ownership. Table 12 illustrates
that performance outcomes are higher for privatized firms vs. state-
owned in industries/regions with a larger above average extent of privati-
zation (col. B & C). This is true for all indicators used. At the same time,
there are no significant performance differences by the extent of privati-
zation without distinguishing between ownership groups (col. A). There-
fore, when we do not control for ownership, there is no relation between
performance and the extent of privatization in the industry/region.
These results are supported by the estimates of the first-stage regres-
sions. In all specifications, jointly significant correlations of the instru-
ments with the instrumented ownership confirm the condition of valid in-
struments cov , 0X Z ≠   . In the cross-section specification and IV
(2SLS) estimation of the pooled data, failure to reject the Davidson–
MacKinnon overidentification test further indicates the instruments
goodness. This result is however not robust in each specification with the
random effects estimators, and thus precludes exclusive reliance on the
estimates of these specifications. The insignificant C statistic supports
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the hypothesis of exogeneity of each included instrument. Furthermore,
one may argue that only random instruments will not violate the condition
cov , 0Z ε =   . Thus, these limitations of the study should be taken into
account in interpreting the results.
Table 12. Sample Firms by Ownership and Extent of Privatization in 1996.
À B C
Average labor productivity 11.6 14.1 11.0
Proportion of privatized firms
in the industry employment
    Below average 17.3 16.0 17.6
    Above average 8.5 12.9 7.5
Proportion of privatized firms
in the region employment
    Below average 9.7 10.0 9.6
    Above average 12.9 16.0 12.0
Proportion of privatized firms
in the industry output
    Below average 15.9 11.6 17.1
    Above average 9.2 15.6 7.7
Proportion of privatized firms
in the region output
    Below average 12.7 14.7 12.3
    Above average 10.9 13.9 10.2
Proportion of privatized firms
in the total number firms
in the industry
    Below average 13.6 8.0 14.9
    Above average 10.9 16.0 9.6
Proportion of privatized firms
in the total number of firms
in the region
    Below average 11.3 14.8 10.5
 Above average 11.9 13.5 11.5
Source: Sample Database. All data entries are in thousand 1995 hryvnyas.
À — All firms; B — Privatized; C — State-owned.
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5. RESULTS
I start the analysis with variables other than those of main concern. The
estimated parameters for production inputs are overwhelmingly signifi-
cant and usually reflect the situation with their use in Ukraine. These are
the large estimate of the labor force share (0.6–0.8) and twice lower es-
timate for capital stock (0.25–0.35). In most cases, the production func-
tion estimation shows decreasing returns to scale, which makes sense
for the Ukrainian industries under study. Furthermore, the significant
positive effects are found for strategic firms and state monopolies.
Clearly, these firms accrue rents and therefore tend to develop rent-
seeking activities (lobbying, bribes, soft budget constraints). Another
significant result is for the privatization group: firms from group 2 tend to
under-perform in comparison to firms in the 3-rd privatization group. As
Walsh and Whelan (2000), I include trade orientation in the firm attain-
ment regression but its estimates are nowhere significant. Finally, there
are important differences by region (southern and western part of
Ukraine are negative associated with firm attainment), industry and year.
Table 13 presents selective results from the 1-st stage ownership re-
gressions. The estimates for instrumental variables are jointly significant.
As some of them are correlated, the individual significance (t-test)
should not be critical in deciding on how well they explain the dependent
instrumented variable. Thus, the significant result for leased firms shows
higher probability of their privatization. This result fits well the setup of
the Ukrainian privatization — preferential buyout or free transfer to insid-
ers of leased firms. Another instrument for ownership, past industry
growth, has a significant positive impact on privatization. Clearly, inves-
tors come to markets with good prospects of development and high fu-
ture return. Table 13 also has results of the tests on the validity of in-
struments (F-test, overidentification test of all instruments, exogeneity
of instruments). With this evidence, I proceed to instrument ownership
with the chosen instruments. However, the findings should be treated
with caution given the insignificant results of overidentification tests
(overidxt2) in the panel data estimation.
For cross-section estimation, the complete results for performance re-
gressions are presented in Tables 14–15. The paper reports cross-
sectional estimates only for regressions with sales revenue as the de-
pendent variable but similar results are obtained for production output
regressions. Tables 16–18 give all estimates of the production function
parameters obtained with the G2SLS random-effects estimators. Both
sales and output regressions have their estimates reported. Table 19
summarizes random-effects estimates for production inputs, ownership
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Table 13. First Stage Ownership Regressions.
Variable À B C D E
Proportion of privatized firms
in the regional production
6.33*
(4.04)
1.38
(2.82)
3.18
(5.26)
2.21
(2.80)
–0.83
(0.69)
Proportion of privatized firms
in the industry employment
–30.41
(17.75)
–23.11
(18.51)
–33.56
(34.56)
–18.22
(18.40)
–4.88
(4.51)
Proportion of privatized firms
in the industry production
15.32
(17.75)
–1.95
(13.95)
30.66
(26.05)
–3.33
(13.87)
1.38
(3.40)
Leasing firm 15.43**
(1.23)
0.99
(0.92)
12.37**
(1.72)
0.79
(0.91)
0.19
(0.22)
Past industry growth 0.07*
(0.04)
0.04
(0.03)
–0.07
(0.05)
0.04
(0.03)
0.01
(0.01)
F test: Prob > F 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.103 0.150
Sargan statistic (Overidentification test
of all instruments) Chi-sq(5) P-val:
From the 2-nd stage equation being
estimated
(Model 1–3 for Sales Revenue) 0.14188 0.79182 0.79182 0.59078 0.59078
C statistic (Exogeneity of the specified
instrument) Chi-sq(1) P-val:
Instrument tested:
— Privatized firms
in the regional output
— Privatized firms
in the industry employment
— Privatized firms
in the industry output
— Leasing firm
— Past industry growth
0.59339
0.96679
0.77214
0.83375
0.22288
0.94034
0.65443
0.43834
0.96325
0.38802
0.94034
0.65443
0.43834
0.96325
0.40316
0.97105
0.58301
0.61214
0.41593
0.95435
0.97105
0.58301
0.61214
0.41593
0.95435
R square 0.423 0.152 0.204 0.137 0.025
Number of observations 3909 3497 3497 3497 3497
Dependent variable is the sum of shares for the ownership category. The performance indi-
cator in the 2-nd stage regression is log(sales). The results from the 1-st stage regressions
are reported only for instrumental variables.
White standard errors are in parentheses; * — p- value <0.10; ** — p- value <0.05.
À — Private ownership, Model 1; B — Concentrated private ownership, Model 2; C — Dispersed
private ownership, Model 2; D — Ownership concentrated by outsiders, Model 3; E — Owner-
ship concentrated by insiders, Model 3.
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and competition in three ownership models. Furthermore, Table 20 gives
estimates of ownership effects in the cross-sectional, pooled IV (2SLS)
and panel data specifications.
Table 14. Cross-Section IV Estimation for Year 2000. Model 1: Privatization.
Sales revenue Production output
Variable
Estimate Standarderror Estimate
Standard
error
Intercept –4.692 2.20 ** –5.104 2.46 **
Labor input, log 0.892 0.09 ** 0.874 0.09 **
Capital stock, log 0.323 0.08 ** 0.324 0.09 **
State ownership Reference Reference
Private ownership 0.057 0.02 ** 0.056 0.02
State monopoly 0.326 0.18 * 0.274 0.19
Regional monopoly –0.066 0.24 –0.185 0.26
Strategic firm 0.916 0.40 ** 0.949 0.42 **
Trade orientation 0.061 0.19 0.041 0.22
Privatization group 1 –0.214 0.45 –0.203 0.53
Privatization group 2 –0.448 0.27 * –0.442 0.32
Privatization group 3 Reference Reference
Market concentration 0.473 0.36 0.445 0.38
Import penetration –1.082 0.66 * –0.939 0.70
Industry price growth 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.01
Eastern region Reference Reference
Western region –0.246 0.16 –0.346 0.17 **
Northern and central
region 0.023 0.15 0.048 0.15
Southern region –0.073 0.22 –0.086 0.24
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Centered R-squared 0.432 0.365
Number of observations 934 934
Dependent variable is ln(sales) and ln(output). Instruments for ownership: a leasing firm indi-
cator, proportions of privatized firms in industry and region production.
* — p-value <0.10; ** — p-value. <0.05.
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Table 15. Cross-Section IV Estimation for Year 2000.
Model 2:
Ownership concentration
Model 3:
Insider vs. outsider
concentrated ownershipVariable
Estimate
Standard
error
Estimate
Standard
error
Intercept –2.170 2.29 –2.696 1.74
Labor input, log 1.104 0.46 ** 1.196 0.17 **
Capital stock, log 0.109 0.39 0.038 0.16
State ownership Reference Reference
Dispersed private
ownership 0.034 0.02 ** 0.031 0.02 *
Concentrated private
ownership 0.081 0.11
Not
relevant
Concentrated private
ownership by insiders
Not
relevant 0.148 0.24
Concentrated private
ownership by outsiders
Not
relevant 0.101 0.04 **
State monopoly 0.298 0.48 * 0.401 0.24 *
Regional monopoly 0.336 1.02 0.559 0.39
Strategic firm 0.534 0.79 0.716 0.34 **
Trade orientation –0.072 0.42 –0.135 0.28
Privatization group 1 0.082 0.59 –0.241 0.82
Privatization group 2 –0.189 0.23 –0.205 0.24
Privatization group 3 Reference Reference
Market concentration 0.403 0.57 0.548 0.41
Import penetration –1.215 1.59 –1.449 1.06
Industry price growth –0.004 0.01 –0.005 0.01
Eastern region Reference Reference
Western region –0.412 0.20 ** –0.418 0.24 *
Northern and central
region 0.022 0.16 0.049 0.18
Southern region –0.389 0.24 * –0.334 0.27
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Centered R-squared 0.469 0.172
Number of observations 934 934
Dependent variable is ln (sales). Instruments for ownership variables: a leasing firm indicator,
proportion of privatized firms in the industry and regional output.
* — p-value <0.10; ** — p-value <0.05.
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Table 16. Random Effects G2SLS Estimation: Privatization. Model 1.
Sales revenue Production output
Variable
Estimate Standard
error
Estimate Standard
error
Intercept 1.23 0.49 ** 0.42 0.40
Labor input, log 0.62 0.03 ** 0.85 0.03 **
Capital stock, log 0.31 0.03 ** 0.21 0.03 **
State ownership Reference Reference
Private ownership 0.02 0.005 ** 0.02 0.003 **
State monopoly 0.42 0.09 ** 0.32 0.07 **
Regional monopoly –0.09 0.14 –0.17 0.10 *
Strategic firm 0.28 0.11 ** 0.33 0.08 **
Trade orientation 0.09 0.11 0.19 0.08 **
Privatization group 1 –0.42 0.28 –0.18 0.21
Privatization group 2 –0.32 0.13 ** –0.27 0.09 **
Privatization group 3 Reference Reference
Market concentration –0.11 0.15 –0.06 0.12
Import penetration –0.41 0.21 * –0.10 0.19
Past industry price growth –0.003 0.001 ** –0.01 0.001 **
Eastern region Reference Reference
Western region –0.29 0.08 ** –0.36 0.06 **
Northern and central
region 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.05
Southern region –0.26 0.10 ** –0.24 0.08 **
Year 1996 0.58 0.28 ** 0.84 0.21 **
Year 1997 0.13 0.15 0.27 0.13 **
Year 1998 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.08
Year 1999 –0.12 0.04 ** –0.06 0.06
Year 2000 Reference Reference
Industry dummies Yes Yes
R-squared 0.729 0.659
Number of observations 3909 3909
Dependent variable is ln(sales) and ln(output). Instruments: proportion of privatized firms in
the regional production, industry production and employment, leasing firm, past industry
growth.
* — p-value <0.10; ** — p-value <0.05.
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Table 17. Random Effects G2SLS Estimation: Ownership Concentration. Model 2.
Sales revenue Production output
Variable
Estimate Standard
error
Estimate Standard
error
Intercept 1.20 0.58 ** 0.37
Labor input, log 0.66 0.04 ** 0.82 0.07 **
Capital stock, log 0.26 0.03 ** 0.19 0.05 **
State ownership Reference Reference
Private dispersed
ownership 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01 **
Concentrated ownership 0.04 0.02 ** 0.05 0.02 **
State monopoly 0.49 0.13 ** 0.49 0.15 **
Regional monopoly 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.19
Strategic firm 0.38 0.17 ** 0.54 0.22 **
Trade orientation 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.14
Privatization group 1 –0.37 0.33 –0.20 0.35
Privatization group 2 –0.20 0.13 * –0.15 0.13
Privatization group 3 Reference Reference
Market concentration 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.21
Import penetration –0.47 0.25 * –0.34 0.30
Past industry price growth –0.004 0.001 ** –0.01 0.002 **
Eastern region Reference Reference
Western region –0.28 0.10 ** –0.33 0.11 **
Northern and central
region 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.09
Southern region –0.26 0.12 ** –0.24 0.13 *
Year 1996 0.89 0.41 ** 1.29 0.51 **
Year 1997 0.61 0.32 * 0.79 0.41 *
Year 1998 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.27
Year 1999 0.07 0.17 0.24 0.25
Year 2000 Reference Reference
Industry dummies Yes Yes
R-squared 0.707 0.607
Number of observations 3497 3497
Dependent variable is ln(sales) and ln(output). Instruments: proportion of privatized firms in
the regional production, industry production and employment, leasing firm, past industry
growth.
* — p-value <0.10; ** — p-value <0.05.
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Table 18. Random Effects G2SLS Estimation: Insider vs. Outsider Concentrated
Ownership. Model 3.
Sales revenue Production output
Variable
Estimate
Standard
error
Estimate
Standard
error
Intercept 1.60 0.94 * 0.57 0.77
Labor input, log 0.59 0.05 ** 0.76 0.07 **
Capital stock, log 0.29 0.07 ** 0.22 0.05 **
State ownership Reference Reference
Private dispersed
ownership 0.01 0.01 * 0.01 0.01 *
Large outsider
shareholding 0.04 0.02 * 0.05 0.03 *
Large insider shareholding –0.004 0.15 0.05 0.19
State monopoly 0.52 0.16 ** 0.51 0.15 **
Regional monopoly 0.06 0.24 0.01 0.21
Strategic firm 0.38 0.19 ** 0.52 0.23 **
Trade orientation 0.07 0.18 ** 0.14 0.16
Privatization group 1 –0.43 0.42 –0.24 0.38
Privatization group 2 –0.19 0.19 –0.16 0.15
Privatization group 3 Reference Reference
Market concentration 0.09 0.29 –0.01 0.23
Import penetration –0.56 0.45 –0.39 0.42
Past industry price growth –0.004 0.002 ** –0.01 0.002 **
Eastern region Reference Reference
Western region –0.23 0.13 * –0.31 0.12 **
Northern and central
region 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.11
Southern region –0.26 0.16 * –0.24 0.15
Year 1996 0.75 0.45 * 1.23 0.54 **
Year 1997 0.49 0.34 0.73 0.43 *
Year 1998 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.27
Year 1999 0.02 0.17 0.22 0.24
Year 2000 Reference Reference
Industry dummies Yes Yes
R-squared overall 0.701 0.615
Number of observations 3497 3497
Dependent variable is ln(sales) and ln(output). Instruments: proportion of privatized firms in
the regional production, industry production and employment, leasing firm, past industry
growth.
* — p-value <0.10; ** — p-value <0.05.
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Table 19. Random Effects G2SLS Estimation: Comparative Selective Estimates.
All Models.
Sales Revenue Production Output
Variable
Estimate
Standard
error
Estimate
Standard
error
State ownership Reference category in all models
Privatization dummy 1.85 0.44 ** 2.17 0.39 **
Market concentration –0.12 0.15 0.01 0.13
Import penetration –0.39 0.22 * –0.08 0.21
Labor input, log 0.71 0.03 ** 0.87 0.03 **
Capital stock, log 0.29 0.03 ** 0.21 0.03 **
R square 0.677 0.600
Privatization share 0.02 0.004 ** 0.02 0.003 **
Market concentration –0.11 0.15 –0.06 0.12
Import penetration –0.41 0.21 * –0.10 0.19
Labor input, log 0.62 0.03 ** 0.85 0.03 **
Capital stock, log 0.31 0.03 ** 0.21 0.03 **
R square 0.729 0.659
Number
of observations: 3,909
Concentrated ownership 0.04 0.02 ** 0.05 0.02 **
Dispersed ownership 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 0.01 **
Market concentration 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.21
Import penetration –0.47 0.25 * –0.34 0.30
Labor input, log 0.66 0.04 ** 0.82 0.07 **
Capital stock, log 0.26 0.03 ** 0.19 0.05 **
R square 0.707 0.607
Concentrated by outsiders 0.04 0.02 * 0.05 0.03 *
Concentrated by insiders –0.004 0.16 0.05 0.19
Dispersed ownership 0.01 0.01 * 0.01 0.01 *
Market concentration 0.09 0.29 –0.003 0.23
Import penetration –0.56 0.45 –0.39 0.42
Labor input, log 0.59 0.05 ** 0.76 0.07 **
Capital stock, log 0.29 0.07 ** 0.22 0.05 **
R square 0.701 0.615
Number of observations 3497 3497
Dependent variable is ln(sales) and ln(output). All model specifications include firm specific
controls, year dummies and industry specific effects.
* — p-value <0.10; ** — p-value <0.05.
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Table 20. Sensitivity of Ownership and Market Competition Estimates to Alterna-
tive Specifications.
Variable À B C
State ownership Reference group in all specifications
Privatization dummy 7.12*
(3.99)
2.05**
(0.49)
1.85**
(0.44)
Market concentration 0.87
(0.71)
–0.08
(0.17)
–0.12
(0.15)
R square 0.374 0.649  0.677
Privatization share 0.06**
(0.02)
0.02**
(0.004)
0.02**
(0.01)
Market concentration 0.47
(0.35)
–0.10
(0.15)
–0.11
(0.15)
R square 0.432 0.717 0.729
Concentrated ownership 0.08
(0.11)
0.04**
(0.02)
0.04**
(0.02)
Dispersed ownership 0.03**
(0.02)
0.02**
(0.01)
0.01**
(0.01)
Market concentration 0.40
(0.57)
–0.02
(0.16)
0.01
(0.19)
R square 0.468 0.700 0.707
Outside blockholder 0.10**
(0.04)
0.04*
(0.02)
0.04*
(0.02)
Inside blockholder 0.15
(0.24)
0.05
(0.17)
–0.004
(0.16)
Dispersed ownership 0.03*
(0.02)
0.02**
(0.01)
0.01*
(0.01)
Market concentration 0.55
(0.41)
–0.02
(0.16)
0.09
(0.29)
R square 0.172 0.702 0.701
Number of observations 934 3947 3947
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Continued from p. 38
Variable D E F
State ownership Reference group in all specifications
Privatization dummy 1.25**
(0.44)
1.74**
(0.42)
0.99**
(0.42)
Market concentration –0.21
(0.15)
–0.26*
(0.16)
–0.11
(0.14)
R square 0.637  0.658 0.736
Privatization share 0.01**
(0.004)
0.01**
(0.005)
0.01**
(0.004)
Market concentration –0.23
(0.16)
–0.27
(0.18)
–0.11
(0.14)
R square 0.656 0.707 0.749
Concentrated ownership 0.04*
(0.03)
0.04**
(0.01)
0.03*
(0.03)
Dispersed ownership 0.01
(0.01)
0.01**
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Market concentration –0.09
(0.24)
–0.22
(0.20)
–0.01
(0.20)
R square 0.551 0.681 0.732
Outside blockholder 0.04
(0.03)
0.04**
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
Inside blockholder 0.02
(0.12)
–0.02
(0.16)
–0.13
(0.19)
Dispersed ownership 0.01
(0.01)
0.01*
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Market concentration –0.09
(0.24)
–0.12
(0.27)
0.06
(0.30)
R square 0.543 0.644 0.644
Number of observations 2238 2776 3497
All table entries are coefficients on ownership categories and market competition parameters
from individual regressions. The dependent variable in each case is ln(sales). All model speci-
fications include firm specific controls, year dummies and industry specific effects.
White standard errors are in parentheses for 2SLS specifications. Standard errors are for
G2SLS specifications. * — p-value <0.10; ** — p- value <0.05.
À — 2SLS for year 2000; B — 2SLS for pooled years, by clustered; C — G2SLS random-
effects; D — G2SLS random-effects without strategic enterprises; E — G2SLS random-effects
without state monopolies; F — G2SLS random-effects with industry specific trends.
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In all specifications, the effect of privatization is overwhelmingly positive.
The estimates of the indicator and continuous privatization variables are
significant at 5% level and robust to changes in the specification and
sample. The difference is large: a percentage point increase in private
ownership implies on average 2% higher productivity per year8. These
growth rates, therefore, evidence to the important beneficial role of pri-
vate ownership and the incentives it provides.
The estimation of regressions that include ownership variables for differ-
ent types of private shareholding also finds a significant and positive ef-
fect of private ownership. The parameter magnitude is however greater
for firms with concentrated private ownership, which in the random ef-
fects specification is 0.03-point difference over firms with diluted owner-
ship and 0.02-point difference in the pooled data IV specification. Saying
differently, annual productivity growth for firms with concentrated owner-
ship is on average 2–3% higher than for other private firms and 4%
larger that for state-owned firms. These results confirm economic the-
ory. Concentrated shareholding deals better with establishing an appro-
priate mechanism of corporate governance and resolving the agency
problem. This effectiveness inevitably reflects in better firm performance.
One caveat is however present in the findings. The cross-section estima-
tion finds a significant positive effect for dispersed ownership but not for
concentrated shareholding. This result is however less likely to represent
the true effect of ownership concentration. When prior firm attainment is
taken into account and changes in performance are evaluated, the effect
of shareholding concentration is significantly positive and stable across
the model specifications.
Outsider-concentrated ownership has a significant and large positive
impact on firm performance. In the cross-sectional specification, the
estimated parameters are significant at 5% level and show 0.07-point
marginal difference in the performance of outsider-concentrated firms
over firms with dispersed private ownership and 0.10-point difference
over state-owned firms. The random effects and pooled data IV esti-
mations give similarly positive but smaller marginal effects of out-
sider-concentrated ownership and at 10% significance level. The
marginal difference is respectively 0.02 and 0.04-point. For insider-
dominated ownership, no significant impact is found in any specifica-
tion. Therefore, firms with dominant outside shareholders perform
                                               
8 Clearly, ownership growth has 100% limit, and may also have important non-
linear marginal effects on performance, e.g. the 50%-benchmark. The non-
monotonic relation between ownership and firm performance presents a topic for
further research.
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best — the result we would expect based on the corporate govern-
ance theory.
The findings on the effect of market competition are not strong. The es-
timates of market competitiveness are statistically insignificant in virtually
all specifications. There are several exceptions of its significant effect at
10% level in the cases when subsets of the sample are estimated. For
the sample that separately drops state monopolies, oil- and chemical-
processing firms, machinery and metal-building companies, the random
effects estimators find a negative association between market concen-
tration and firm sales in the model of privatization (Tables 20, 21). These
results, however, disappear when several ownership variables are used
in estimation (4; 5).
Table 21. Sensitivity of Ownership and Market Competition Estimates to Alterna-
tive Specifications: Industry Factor.
Variable À B C D E
State ownership Reference group in all specifications
Privatization dummy 1.85**
(0.44)
1.66**
(0.46)
1.67**
(0.43)
2.00**
(0.48)
1.72**
(0.49)
Market concentration –0.12
(0.15)
–0.08
(0.16)
–0.09
(0.15)
–0.18
(0.15)
–0.49*
(0.23)
Import penetration –0.39*
(0.22)
–0.12
(0.27)
–0.44**
(0.22)
–0.83**
(0.26)
–0.39*
(0.24)
Privatization share 0.02**
(0.005)
0.02**
(0.004)
0.01**
(0.004)
0.02**
(0.004)
0.01**
(0.005)
Market concentration –0.11
(0.15)
–0.12
(0.15)
–0.12
(0.13)
–0.23*
(0.13)
–0.47*
(0.23)
Import penetration –0.41*
(0.21)
–0.26
(0.24)
–0.42**
(0.19)
–0.77**
(0.22)
–0.38*
(0.23)
Concentrated
ownership
0.04**
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.03)
0.02
(0.02)
0.04**
(0.02)
0.02**
(0.01)
Dispersed ownership 0.01**
(0.01)
0.01**
(0.01)
0.01*
(0.004)
0.01**
(0.01)
0.02**
(0.01)
Market concentration 0.01
(0.19)
0.07
(0.23)
–0.08
(0.19)
–0.08
(0.19)
–0.39
(0.25)
Import penetration –0.47*
(0.25)
0.03
(0.37)
–0.49**
(0.25)
–0.89**
(0.29
–0.37
(0.25)
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Continued from p. 41
Variable À B C D E
Outside blockholder 0.04*
(0.02)
0.05*
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)
0.02
(0.02)
Inside blockholder –0.004
(0.16)
0.02
(0.15)
0.04
(0.13)
–0.02
(0.18)
0.11
(0.17)
Dispersed ownership 0.01*
(0.01)
0.01*
(0.01)
0.01**
(0.004)
0.01*
(0.01)
0.02**
(0.01)
Market concentration 0.09
(0.29)
0.14
(0.31)
–0.08
(0.17)
0.02
(0.34)
–0.37
(0.37)
Import penetration –0.56
(0.45)
–0.01
(0.48)
–0.44
(0.29)
–0.96
(0.65)
–0.22
(0.31)
Number
of observations 3497 3319 3241 3340 2459
All table entries are coefficients on ownership categories, market domestic and foreign com-
petition parameters from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each case is
ln(sales). All model specifications include firm specific controls, year dummies, and industry
specific effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* — p-value <0.10; ** — p-value <0.05.
À — All sample; B — Without energy sector; C — Without metallurgy; D — Without oil and
chemical processing; E — Without machinery and metal-building.
The results on the effect of import penetration — or foreign competi-
tion — are more stable but still inconclusive. The significant at 10% level
negative estimates of import penetration effects are shown in several
model specifications and mainly in the revenue regressions. For exam-
ple, the cross-sectional estimation finds a significant effect for foreign
competition only when the outcome variable is firm revenue. Similarly,
the random effects estimation gives a significant negative impact of im-
port penetration in the sales regression only and not across all model
specifications. Failure to find conclusive evidence on the significant role
of market structure may be explained by two factors. Competition is a
recent phenomenon in Ukraine, and its effects might not be observable
in the data yet. Another issue is methodological and relates to the use of
alternative measures of market competition, for example, to model a
non-monotonic relation between competition and firm attainment.
I check the robustness of ownership and market competition results in
various contexts (Tables 20, 21). I instrument the ownership variables
and apply IV (2SLS) procedure to estimate the cross-section data in
2000 and to the pooled clustered data. The results mostly correspond to
those obtained with the G2SLS random-effects estimation. I further
check the sensitivity of ownership and market structure estimates to
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changes in the model specifications. I estimate separate regressions for
each case without strategic enterprises, state monopolies9, regulated in-
dustries and industries where the government interference is relatively
high. For Ukraine, these industries are mainly energy sector, metallurgy
and oil-processing. I add industry specific (linear) trends to see if there
are industry-specific trends that may affect the ownership and market
competition results. In general, the sensitivity analysis gives estimates
similar to those of the main specification. Estimation of the sample with-
out strategic enterprises, as well as the sample without state monopo-
lies, gives 0.01-point lower estimates of the privatization effect. Adding
industry trends does not change the main estimation results.
Finally, Table 21 presents the estimation results when specific industries
were excluded. The estimates point to similar conclusions made for the
complete sample. However, several distinctions may be worth mention-
ing. First, dropping firms from the oil- and chemical-processing sector,
as well as machinery and metal-building, gives different results for the
effects of market concentration. The coefficients are negative and sig-
nificant at 10% level in the specification with the aggregate privatization
share and at 5% level in the specification of concentrated and dispersed
ownership variables. Compared to the basic specification, the estimates
of the privatization effects are 0.01-point lower for the sample without
metallurgic and machine-building firms. The ownership concentration
effect is 0.01-point larger for the sample without energy firms over the
estimates for the whole sample. These findings indicate important indus-
try differences in the shareholding structure and firm performance in
Ukraine.
6. CONCLUSION
In this study, I attempt to shed light on the causes of post-reform differ-
ences in the performance of Ukrainian firms. Within the "big" question
agenda on determinants of firm performance in Ukraine, I focus on the
effects of the two main post-Soviet economic reforms — privatization and
market competition.
The findings are threefold. First, the study provides evidence for Ukraine
that firm performance improves with privatization. More efficient per-
formance of privatized firms is found in the analysis, which corrects for
nonrandom sequencing of firms to privatization and various (therefore
endogenous) ownership structures. Second, the positive effect of privati-
                                               
9 The number of regional but non-state monopolies is low to change the results.
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zation is particularly strong when several private owners concentrate
ownership. There is some indication that privatized firms with significant
outside shareholders are most efficient. Another finding is that market
competition has virtually no role in determining firm performance in
Ukraine.
This study provides two contributions for public policymaking. Methodol-
ogically, it applies a combination of instrumental variables and random
effects to control for biases in the estimation of causal effects when ran-
dom assignment is not feasible. The endogenous ownership structure is
instrumented to account for unobservable biases in the privatization pro-
cess. Time and firm specific controls capture the effects of general eco-
nomic trends and time-invariant differences across firms. Applying this
methodological approach, the study estimates the effects of the crucial
transition reforms drawing from panel data on 1,211 medium and large-
size industrial Ukrainian firms for the five-year period.
Substantively, the study finds politically important evidence to the benefi-
cial impact of privatization for Ukrainian firms. It indicates the critical role
of establishing an effective mechanism of corporate governance, which
shareholding with large owners assures best. The message for privatiza-
tion policymaking therefore is that the effectiveness of the corporate
governance mechanism determines the ultimate success of privatization
in bringing efficiency gains. Failure to establish such a mechanism,
added to incomplete market institutions, will yield results different from
those expected. Therefore, ownership transformation should be followed
by radical reforms in the governance of a firm, which concentrated
shareholding implements most effectively.
Knowing about the critical role of effective corporate governance should
help the government make better privatisation policy choices. Thus, of
the possible privatization methods, sales of large stock at commercial
tenders and shares distribution at stock exchanges are the two recom-
mended alternatives. Privatization policy, which orients at strategic large
investors, capable of pushing restructuring and bringing investment to
newly-privatized firms, should become a priority for Ukrainian authorities.
Instituting privatization under efficiency rather than distribution objectives
would help Ukrainian firms to operate more efficiently, to raise budget
revenues, and finally to speed transition to a market economy.
The finding on the insignificant effect of market competition in Ukraine's
transition environment suggests important need for further market re-
form. Large political effort is required to ensure that Ukraine is moving
towards competitive market and efficiency gains for the public benefit.
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